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Abstract 
 
Whilst we acknowledge that Hezbollah is considered by some as a social movement, there is a distinct 
shortage of literature that tries to describe it as such using social movement theory. We discuss that 
Resource Mobilisation Theory would be an effective social movement theory in discussing how 
Hezbollah mobilises key resources such as its support base and conscience constituents. It is also 
effective in analysing the different tactics and strategies employed by the organisation. Moreover it 
can be utilised in explaining how Hezbollah uses its resources such as the media and institutions in 
order to relate to society. Furthermore, we argue that Political Opportunity Theory can be used to 
explain why Hezbollah built political alliances and how they exploited weaknesses in the Lebanese 
political system. We argue that although Hezbollah can be defined as a social movement, it is too 
institutionalised to be solely considered as that. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout this semester, we have worked under the general theme of 'Globalisation, Political 
Culture, Civil Society and Social Movements’. We have chosen to write about an organisation that 
can be associated with all four of these concepts. As Samii (2008: 32) observes, the categorisation of 
Hezbollah is not straightforward and it may be considered as different things by different people. As 
Gleis and Berti (2012: 7) note, to some it is a terrorist organisation whilst to others it is a guerrilla 
group. To much of the Arab world it is a resistance and liberation movement. However, many 
Lebanese citizens view it predominantly as a mainstream political party or a successful social 
movement with an extensive social welfare network. It is from the last of these perspective that we 
will be examining Hezbollah for the purpose of this project. We will be analysing it as a social 
movement and examining the extensive social welfare network that it has created for Lebanese 
civilians.  
Since its birth, Hezbollah has transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate, 
mainstream political party with its own resistance wing. It is because of its multiple facets that 
Hezbollah divides opinion amongst the international community. Washington has long branded both 
the political party and its military arm as terrorist orgnaisations. Byman (2003: 54) notes that before 
the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, Hezbollah were responsible for the deaths of more 
Americans that any other terrorist organisation. Shortly after the ‘War on Terror’ was launched by the 
American government, leading scholars and former government officials wrote an open letter to 
President Bush declaring ‘that any war on terrorism must target Hezbollah’ (ibid). However, 
America’s European counterparts only agreed to blacklist the military branch as a terorist organisation 
last year (Black 2013). This followed the start of its participation in the Syrian civil war and two 
terrorist attacks on Israeli tourist groups in Bulgaria and Cyprus in 2012, which it is believed to have 
been responsible for. However, the EU ignored pressure from the US and Israel to ban the Lebanese 
organisation outright, allowing contacts with its political representatives (Pawlak and Croft 2013) 
The foundations of Hezbollah were established out of the social and political grievances of the Shiite 
population in southern Lebanon. The name Hezbollah comes from a Koranic verse promising triumph 
to those who join the Party of God  (Ashley 2012: 187).  Its stated objectives include the 
establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Lebanon, the destruction of Israel and the elimination of 
Western influence from the Middle East (Martin 2003: 114). In order to try and achieve these 
objectives, it has established its own political movement, armed militia and social services (Martin 
2003: 114). Hezbollah professionalised its military capabilities and also joined Lebanon’s political 
process and enmeshed itself into the social fabric of Lebanese society at the end of the country’s 15 
year war in the early 1990s. The political wing runs a variety of social programs in the south of the 
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country, providing schooling, medical care and welfare to the Lebanese Shia. Members also deliver 
drinking water to slums, repair roads and feed the poor (Kushner 2003: 168). Furthermore the group 
possesses its own radio and satellite television stations which serve as the primary propaganda engine 
for anti-Israeli and anti-American messages to the Islamic world in multiple languages (Ibid). 
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Problem Area 
 
This research project will analyse social movement theory in order to investigate whether or not it is 
instrumental in describing the evolution of Hezbollah. As a political party, Hezbollah joined the 
Lebanese political process in 1992 (Norton 2007: 101) following the 1989 Taif agreement. This 
addressed some of Lebanon’s deep rooted sectarian issues and brought about an end to its civil war 
(Masters and Laub 2014). It won eight parliamentary seats (out of a possible 128) whilst competing in 
its first national election. Analysts note the group's political strength grew significantly in May 2008 
after Hezbollah was effectively granted veto power in the cabinet via the so-called Doha agreement. 
The accord helped bring an end to an eighteen-month-long political crisis that culminated in 
Hezbollah's takeover of West Beirut (Ibid). In recent years, Hezbollah has continued to play a 
consequential role in Lebanese politics. The group brought down the government of Saad Hariri, a 
Saudi-backed Sunni, in 2011. Subsequently they helped to usher in a replacement Prime Minister 
Najib Mikati (Ibid). However, it then forced his departure from office and a collapse of the 
government in March 2013 in a dispute over the Lebanese security forces. 
The majority of existing literature predominantly focuses on Hezbollah’s military wing and its 
involvement in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict.  There seems to be a distinct shortage of literature 
looking at Hezbollah as a social movement and how social movement theory can be used to explain 
its development. This project attempts to address this lack of literature. We attempt to investigate how 
if the organisation can be considered as a social movement and we also examine two key social 
movement theories in order to investigate whether or not they are constructive in analysing 
Hezbollah’s resources and political opportunities. We discuss the work of American Sociologists John 
D McCarthy and Mayer N Zald (1977) in considering if ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory’ (RMT) is 
constructive in explaining how Hezbollah utilises its resources in order to try and achieve its aims and 
objectives. We also discuss the work of political scientist David S Meyer (2004) in discussing if 
‘Political Opportunity Theory’ is instrumental in understanding the political conditions from which 
Hezbollah has maximised its political influence. We shall do this by conducting a study based 
primarily on secondary readings of journal and newspaper articles and books published on Hezbollah.   
Our intention of carrying out this research project is to enhance our understanding of how an 
organisation such as Hezbollah continues to receive sustained support from the Lebanese public. Both 
of us writing this project have an interest in working in international security once we have concluded 
our higher education.  Subsequently we feel that this project topic will make us more attractive to 
prospective employers. One of us already has experience of working for an international law 
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enforcement agency who investigate suspected terrorist financing transactions. The other has 
experience in working with political parties and organisations in the MENA region.   
 
Research Question 
 
Can Hezbollah be understood as a social movement and how can its evolution be described in terms 
of social movement theories? 
 
Working Questions 
There is a vast amount of academic research that has been conducted on social movements. The term 
‘Social Movement Theory’ incorporates a wide spectrum of work that attempts to account for 
numerous areas concerning social movements from their creation to achieving their specified goals 
and objectives. We have chosen two social movement theories that focus on the resources of social 
movements and their political opportunities. Examining these two theories will assist us in answering 
our research question. Thus we have devised the below working questions:  
 
 Can Resource Mobilisation Theory be used to understand how Hezbollah mobilises its 
resources? 
 
 Can Political Opportunity Theory be used to understand how Hezbollah gains political 
influence? 
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Project Design 
 
Thus far our Introduction has explained that Hezbollah is an entity that is very hard to categorise. We 
have discussed that some consider it to be a social movement but there is a shortage of literature 
examining it from this perspective. We have stated that we intend to examine if Social Movement 
Theory is instrumental in understanding Hezbollah’s evolution. We have devised a research question 
and two working questions in order to achieve this.  
Our first Chapter ‘Methodology’ discusses the methods that we have employed and the approaches 
that we have taken in order to produce this project. It justifies why we have conducted an explorative 
case study as well as discussing why we have selected our two theories. It also considers some of the 
key texts we have used and the dominant limitations that we have encountered whilst producing this 
work.  
Our second chapter ‘Theoretical Framework’ provides a detailed explanation of what social 
movements are and how they have evolved. It also discusses social movements in the context of Islam 
explaining why Islamic movements tend to arise. It gives an overview of both ‘Resource Mobilisation 
Theory’ (RMT) and ‘Political Opportunity Theory’ before discussing the specific work of McCarthy 
and Zald (1977) and David Meyer (2004). We demonstrate how we will use their texts in regards to 
analysing SMT and applying it to Hezbollah. These two theories are central to our two working 
questions. 
As stated before Hezbollah is a complex entity and this reflects the conditions from which it arose. 
Therefore our third chapter ‘Contextualisation’ provides an overview of the some of the ethnic, 
religious, political and social factors responsible for its birth. Furthermore it charts its history by 
explaining key events such as the two Israeli wars and explains the ideology on which Hezbollah is 
built. Additionally it describes how the organisation is structured and how it operates. Finally we 
attempts to bring the reader up to date by discussing some of the key issues that Hezbollah faces 
today. 
In our fourth chapter ‘Analysis’ is split into two sections in order to answer the relevant working 
questions. The first section considers the work of McCarthy and Zald (1977) in considering if RMT is 
instrumental in analysing the resources of Hezbollah. The second section considers the work of Meyer 
(2004) in explaining if ‘Political Opportunity Theory’ is instrumental in analysing how Hezbollah 
maximises its political influence.      
In our Conclusion we re-visit the two working questions answered in our analysis before answering 
our research question. We will then summarise how we could have improved our project or state what 
we could have done differently in our Afterthought. 
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This project discusses if Hezbollah can be understood as a social movement and if its evolution can be 
described in terms of social movement theories. It attempts to answer the research question through 
addressing our specified working questions. These consider if     Resource Mobilisation Theory 
(RMT) and Political Opportunity Theory can be used in order to gain an insight into how Hezbollah 
mobilises its resources and gains political influence. We have adopted a case study method using a 
qualitative approach. The information we have collated is secondary data written by experts on 
Hezbollah, Social Movement Theory and Islamic, Lebanese and Shiite Identity.   
Using a qualitative approach enables us to acquire an extensive understanding of the complex socio-
political and religious history that has been responsible for the creation of Hezbollah. A qualitative 
approach enables us to navigate our way through such complexities and also allows for an extensive 
consideration of the two Social Movement Theories that we examine. These two theories are complex 
notions that incorporate a large range of work from various academics. A qualitative approach enables 
us to explore such works in depth. We do not see how or where quantitative analysis would have been 
incorporated into this project.  
Case Study 
A case study requires a detailed and intensive analysis of a specific case. “The most common use of 
the term ‘case’ associates the case study with a location, such as a community or organization. The 
emphasis tends to be upon an intensive examination of the setting” (Bryman 2008: 53). In this project, 
the study of location is Hezbollah and the intensive analysis describes how RMT and Political 
Opportunity Theory can be used to explain the way in which the organisation mobilises its resources 
and takes advantage of political opportunities in order to maximize its influence within Lebanon.  
 
Data Collection 
The data collection for this project consists primarily of secondary data, predominantly accumulated 
through a range of books, journal articles and newspaper articles. We managed to obtain several 
books on Hezbollah. Some titles such as August Richard Norton’s ‘Hezbollah: A Short History’, 
along with ‘Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study’ by Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti and 
‘Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism’ by Judith Palmer Harik provided concise overviews of 
the organisation and key events during its history. These texts were particularly useful in creating our 
Contextualisation chapter. Other titles tended to focus specifically on certain aspects of the 
organisation. Zahera Harb’s ‘Channels of Resistace in Lebanon’ was very useful in understanding the 
way in which Hezbollah uses its media outlets in order to transmit its ideals to the public and 
consequently this text was particularly useful in our analysis. Eitan Azani’s ‘Hezbollah: The Story of 
the Party of God’ was particularly useful in our analysis as it considered the party as a social 
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movement. It also considers how social movements within the Muslim society can be explained using 
theoretical frameworks, including Political opportunity Theory. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr’s 
‘Shiite Lebanon: Transational Religion and the Making of Identities’ did not focus on Hezbollah, 
however it gives a detailed account of the Shiite identity and therefore was useful in understanding the 
conditions from which the organisation arose.        
As we were unable to travel to Lebanon to conduct fieldwork (see delimitations below), the primary 
sources we had access to were limited. Translated by Dalia Khalil, ‘Hizbullah’ is written by the 
Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, and offers direct translations of key Hezbollah 
documents such as the open letter written in 1985. At the time of writing (1977) John D. McCarthy 
and Mayer N. Zald’s ‘Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’ was pioneering in the 
field of Resource Mobilisation Theory and therefore it must be considered a primary source. This text 
also acted as the theoretical framework for our focus on RMT.    
Charles Tilly’s book ‘Social Movements 1768-2004’ gave us a good overview of what social 
movements are and how they have developed over time. In addition to this book, we also used a range 
of online journal articles in order to explore different interpretations of the theory. J. Craig Jenkins 
(1983) ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory and the Study of Social Movements’ was one such selected 
example amongst others. 
We gained an understanding of Political Opportunity Theory using several journal articles. David 
Meyer (2004) ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’ acted as out predominant source and subsequently 
helped to form our theoretical framework for our focus on ‘Political Opportunity Theory’. We also 
resorted to another David Meyer text in our research, one he had written in collaboration with Debra 
C Minkoff (2004) ‘Conceptualising Political Opportunity’. Eitan Azani’s book ‘Hezbollah: The Story 
of the Party of God’ also offered a clear account of political opportunities. 
 
Delimitations 
‘Social Movement Theory’ is an umbrella term that incorporates research into many areas that 
concern social movements. It would not be possible to explore all of these fields of research. 
Therefore in order to comply with the specified deadline and character limit of the project, we had to 
specify two social movement theories. The two theories chosen tries to answer the questions of how a 
social movement mobilises its resources and how social movements gain and claim political 
opportunity. 
In the project we have chosen to concentrate on ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory’ (RMT) and ‘Political 
Opportunity Theory’. Again, these are two separate umbrella terms comprising of the work of many 
academics. Taking time and content restraints into consideration, we decided to concentrate on the 
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work of McCarthy and Zald (1977) in discussing RMT. Although this is not one of the most 
contemporary accounts of RMT, the theorists are two of the most influential within this school. Most 
importantly it provides a clear and concise overview of what RMT entails. In the context of Political 
Opportunity Theory, we have concentrated on the texts of David Mayer (2004). Mayer gives a good 
overview of important scholars work on Political Opportunity Theory and pinpoints some of the 
theory’s most important elements. 
By concentrating solely on Hezbollah, opposed to examining several Islamic movements we are able 
to provide a more comprehensive analysis within the specified time period. A comparison to other 
movements would have been very interesting, however the amount of resources and time that would 
have been required to do this meant such a study would have been impractical.   
Due to the time constraints, we were unable to travel to Lebanon to conduct fieldwork for primary 
data. Even though the university provided the funding for such a trip, to Lebanon, none of the sources 
that we contacted replied to our enquiries. We e-mailed several journalists and academics that have 
specialist knowledge on Hezbollah and the Lebanese political system. However, unfortunately we 
received no reply from them. We feel that we would have benefitted from the experience of 
conducting qualitative interviews and including primary data in our project.   
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Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to explain how Hezbollah has evolved using social movement theory, we must first define 
what a social movement is. Furthermore we must fully explain the two forms of social movement 
theory that we will discuss in our analysis. In order to understand a movement such as Hezbollah, 
social movement theories can be instrumental in providing an insight into the dynamics and desired 
objectives of the organisation. The first theory we will consider is Resource Mobilisation Theory. We 
will be using this in order to try and understand how Hezbollah mobilises resources such as funding 
and labour in order to try and achieve its desired goals. The second theory that we shall discuss is 
Political Opportunity Theory. This shall be used in an attempt to understand how Hezbollah tries to 
maximise its political influence by exploiting external political conditions. This chapter will also 
discuss why Islamist movements tend to arise.    
 
Definitions and Origins of Social Movements  
Social movements aim at bringing about political or social change by a collection of individuals 
binding together. Tilley (2004: 1) argues that social movements are organisations comprising of 
various interest groups who are bound together by one common grievance. In most cases, this 
grievance will be the commonly perceived lack of democracy within a specific political setting. The 
African-American Civil Rights Movement (1955–68)  in the United States, whose goal was to end 
racial segregation and discrimination against black Americans and enforce constitutional voting 
rights to them, is a primary example of a successful social movement. It achieved its aims and 
subsequently helped to shape the world in which we now live. Social movements are a product of 
modernity and their proliferation has resulted in an increased influence in political and social change. 
Such organisations can operate on a regional, national and international scale. 
Whilst there are many different definitions as to what social movements are, for the purpose of this 
project we have decided to adopt Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly’s (1996: 874) definition: 
‘sustained challenges to powerholders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the 
jurisdiction or influence of those powerholders’ .  
 
We have chosen to use this definition as these two scholars were two of the original pioneers of social 
movement theory and therefore we feel that they are able to provide an accurate definition of what 
constitutes a social movement.  
Whilst popular risings of one kind or another have occurred across the world for thousands of years, it 
was not until 300 years ago that inclusive organisations comprising of different interest groups came 
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into existence. In the late 18th Century people in Western Europe and North America began to create 
organised social movements (Tilley 2004: 3). Traditional social movements were aligned with politics 
of interest and redistribution. Their focus was on socio-economic structures and / or structures of 
political domination. They were concerned with creating power for specific classes or class-like 
collectives who were defined through their relationships with the employment market or means of 
production. Tilly (2004: 3-4) explains that social movements emerged from an “innovative synthesis” 
of the following three elements: 
1. a sustained, organized public effort marking collective claims on target authorities 
(let us call it a campaign); 
 
2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: 
creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn 
processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in 
public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the 
social movement repertoire); and 
 
3. participants’ concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies 
(call them WUNC displays). (Ibid.) 
 
 
The term WUNC (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment) is a central part of political 
opportunity theory and the displays of WUNC have been seen in religious martyrdom, civic sacrifice 
and resistance to conquest. When the trade union movement emerged in the nineteenth century in the 
industrialised countries and acquired the right to organise, assemble and strike, it was through social 
movement campaigns where displays of WUNC were essential (Tilly, 2004: 5). 
Tilly (2004: 5) specifies the four words behind the term WUNC: 
Worthiness: sober demeanor; neat net clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and 
mothers with children; 
Unity: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing 
and chanting; 
Numbers: headcounts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling 
streets; 
Commitment: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and handicapped; 
resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction.  
 
A social movement is best created under some specific conditions. E.g. demographic and social 
changes are some of the most important factors for creating social protest movements (Azani, 2011: 
4-5). Urbanisation and industrialisation have had a big influence on social structures and the structures 
of the local communities and given good conditions for the arising of social protest movements. In 
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several countries around the world the urbanisation processes was faster than the governmental 
systems could provide basic and vital service, which started the unrest and social conflicts (ibid). 
Social movements can be seen as conflictual, especially because of the means that they employ. These 
methods include large public demonstration, disruptive direct action and innovative symbolic 
initiatives (Della Porta, 2008: 28). Feelings of solidarity and belonging are instrumental in the 
strengthening of motivation within a social movement.  Positive emotions such as hope, pride and 
indignation, as well as negative emotions such as fear or shame are all tied to the association of a 
social movement and have an influence on the dynamics amongst its members (Della Porta, 2008: 
43). 
Solidarity with the local population is important for the cohesion of a social movement. Della Porta 
(2008) notes how a social movement is brought together through a mutual feeling of injustice. These 
feelings of unfairness or marginalisation are essential in the binding of the movement and local 
community. Furthermore the cohesiveness of the group members can be further strengthened if they if 
they encounter confrontation with the police or other external parties whilst protesting. Such 
confrontation can create a sense of belonging amongst the members (Ibid).  
The outcome and success of social movements can be categorised into four categories: Full success; 
co-optation, which means acceptance but no benefits; pre-emption, which means benefits but no 
acceptance; and failure (Jenkins, 1983: 543). Jenkins describes the different categories: 
In general, successful movement organizations were bureaucratic, pursued narrow 
goals, employed selective incentives, enjoyed sponsorship, used unruly methods 
(including violence), and made their demands during periods of socio-political crisis. 
Co-opted organizations tended to have larger memberships and formalized structures; 
they mounted their challenges during wartime. Pre-empted organizations were typically 
small, centrally controlled, and less active during crisis periods (Ibid.) 
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Islamic Social Movements 
In order to establish whether or not Hezbollah can be considered as a social movement, we must first 
discuss the relationship between social movements and Islamic society. Bayat (2005: 891) argues how 
movements within the Islamic world have only recently been accounted for by the use of social 
movement theory. This section attempts to explain the primary contributing factors behind the 
emergence of Islamic social movements. It takes into consideration certain factors that are unique to 
Islam and would not be applicable to social movements of other cultures. In order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of Hezbollah, it is important to appreciate the unique Islamic factors 
that contribute towards Islamic social movements.   
Azani (2011) argues that religion plays a big part of many modern social protest movements. Religion 
provides exclusive solutions for the preservation of commitment to a collective purpose and is 
assimilated in to all social layers, something people are committed to from birth, and therefore 
religion is easy to connect to in times of social distress (Azani, 2011: 18-20). Furthermore the 
religious system is also a good source of recruiting activists for both individual and collective causes. 
Activists recruited from religious communities are more often ready to sacrifice their own personal 
interests for the shared purpose of the social movement (ibid.) Furthermore Azani (2011:18 -20) notes 
that religious communities have a lot of organisational strengths as they possess strong leadership and 
finances, along with efficient communication and social networks. These are important contributing 
factors behind structural and recruitment elements of social protest movements.  
The vision to all Islamic movements is based on the idea of the ‘Umma’ – the establishing of the 
Islamic community of believers that will unite all Muslims of the world and restore Islam’s status as 
the leading factor in the world (Azani 2011: 23). The tools required to achieve this goal are known as 
‘Jihad’ (holy struggle) and ‘Dawa’ (invitation, propagation or call). Traditionally Islamic social 
movements have been successful in providing the supporters with a social safety net through Islamic 
welfare institutions and also providing the supporters with a moral community; in associations, 
mosques, alternative dress code, schooling, health centres and Islamic weddings (Bayat, 2005: 898).  
Azani sets up four explanations of why Islamic social protest movements emerged. The first 
justification is a social one. Social protest movements are the product of social and demographic 
changes. The extent of their success depends on the existence of suitable preliminary organisational 
conditions and political opportunities. In a time of crisis the development of social protest movements 
accelerate. The value of Islam acts as a common denominator, upon which religious fanaticism grows 
(Azani 2011: 29). In the case of Hezbollah, this fanaticism was then translated into revolutionary 
activism.    
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The second explanation is a theological-social explanation. Since the mid-1970s there has been a 
discussion that Islam has become weak as ruling elites have adopted Western values and disseminated 
them out to the entire populations. Azani (2011: 29) argues that values such as secularity and 
modernity pushed traditional Muslim values to the margins as ruling regimes invested in the 
assimilation of the idea of nationality opposed to Islam as the basis for social solidarity.  As the 
Islamic establishments were heavily depended on the ruling regimes, they were unable to prevent this 
change and even cooperated and involved rationales and interpretations from the scriptures and 
tradition to justify this shift (Sivan 1986 in ibid.) Bayat (2005: 894) argues that Islamic activism is 
about ‘extra-ordinary religiosity’ of the population in modern times. This entails practising and 
preaching traditional Islamic values in contrast to the ones imported from the West.     
The third explanation concerns social identity crisis. Since the nineteenth century, Muslim societies 
have experienced social changes in continuous conflict with the influence of Western culture. It 
started as a struggle against colonialism and later became a struggle against Arab regimes, which were 
established on the basis of a Western model, and contradicted the Islamic approach. The new nation-
states failed to deliver the economic prosperity and security they promised; furthermore they suffered 
a series of defeats in the wars against Israel; this has lead to an identity crisis in many Muslim 
societies and resulted in the Muslim societies considering alternatives to the existing regimes (Azani, 
2011: 30). Among several Islamic revolutionaries the goal was to replace Western liberalism, secular 
imperialism with Islam “as an indigenous and all-embracing human alternative” (Bayat 2005: 895). 
The last explanation is a demographic justification. The first wave of urbanisation in the Arab states 
started in the 1950s and saw millions of people moving from the country to the city.  The first wave of 
immigration to the cities primarily consisted of people from the working class. This mass immigration 
put pressure on the job and housing markets, as well as public services. This resulted in people living 
in slums that surrounded the cities, which were marginalised from basic public and welfare services. 
The social distress, loss of feeling of belonging and alienation from the societal elites gave support to 
the development of religious fanaticism (Azani, 2011: 30-31). The second wave of urbanisation 
entailed middle-class youths emigrating from the country to the city in order to seek education to 
improve their socioeconomic status and social mobility. The masses of new university graduates 
found it very difficult to find employment matching their education and therefore their expectation of 
economic improvement was not fulfilled. Furthermore the economic liberalisation of some Arab states 
in the 1970s resulted in high inflation that corroded their wages. The collapse of expectations for 
economic changes contributed to people feeling alienated against the existing social-political order. 
For this group, the return to Islam was seen as an answer to the values represented by modernity (I 
bid). 
All of the above points are unique explanations for the creation of Islamic social movements. Each of 
these justifications can be applied to the emergence of Hezbollah as it is an organisation that has been 
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shaped by religion, ethnic identity and demographics. Although ever present throughout this project, 
these three notions do not constitute the core of it. This will comprise of analysis examining how 
Hezbollah mobilises its resources and how they exploit opportunities within political society. In order 
to do this we will discuss the theories of ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘Political Opportunity’.    
Resource Mobilisation Theory 
Resource Mobilisation Theory arose as a challenge to the preceding bodies of literature that examined 
social movements. The ‘Relative Deprivation’ approach was widely employed in the social movement 
literature of the late 1960s and 1970s (Gurney and Tierney 1982: 33). This considered frustration and 
grievances to account for social movements. This approach replaced the earlier ‘Collective 
Behaviour’ perspective which viewed social movements as resulting from expressions of irrational 
impulses. (Ibid). Caniglia and Carmin note (2005: 202) that this early perspective of social 
movements such as the work of Gurr (1970) and Kornhauser (1959) suggested that protest and other 
types of disruptive action were irrational or used only by marginalised members of society.  
The emergence of Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) offered an alternative perspective by arguing 
that collective action is a rational response that can only occur when adequate resources are available 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977 in I bid). There is no universal definition of the term ‘Resource 
Mobilisation Theory’ and there is much debate as to what the label should incorporate. However, 
Edwards and McCarthy (2004: 118) argue that essentially it attempts to gain a better understanding of 
how groups are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue 
social change.  
Jenkins (1983: 532) describes mobilisation as “the process by which a group secures collective 
control over the resources needed for collective action”. Social movement groups mobilise both 
tangible and intangible resources. Tangible resources include facilities, land and means of 
communication. Intangible resources entail specialised labour resources such as organising and legal 
skills and unspecialised labour of supporters. (Jenkins, 1983: 533) 
Resource mobilisation theory examines the variety of resources that must be mobilised in order for a 
social movement to achieve its political goals and objectives. This entails the linkages between the 
social movements and other groups in the society, the social movement’s dependence of external 
support for being successful in achieving its goals and the tactics the authorities use to control or 
incorporate the social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1213). The approach depends more on 
political sociological and economic theories opposed to the preceding social psychological approach 
of collective behaviour (Ibid: 1212).   It considers the tactics employed by social movements in order 
to mobilise resources and the societal support they recieve and constraints experienced by them (Ibid.; 
1213). 
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Jenkins (1983: 533) argues parties from whom social movements have mobilised resources include a 
“conscience constituency” which tends to comprise of wealthy elites, the affluent middle class and 
college students. From the “conscience constituency” social movements have mobilised institutional 
resource from private foundations, social welfare institutions, mass media, universities, governmental 
agencies and business corporations. These resources have developed social movements into 
professional organisations with outside leadership, full time employees, small scale or non-existent 
membership and collective actions “speaking for” an aggrieved group, opposed to involving them in 
their activities. 
Even though the supporters of the social movements provide major support, e.g. money, facilities and 
labour, they may not necessarily have commitment to the values that underlie the specific social 
movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1216). One of the suggestions why people from the public elite 
get involved in social movements is that they have a desire to contain or control the impact of the 
social movement or even to exploit the societal conflict imposed by the social movement for their 
own gain (Pichardo, 1988: 101).  
Movement supporters act both out of internalised values as well as calculations of self-interest; 
therefore mobilisation needs to generate solidarity and moral commitment to the collective that the 
social movement represents.  It is easier to mobilise groups with strong distinctive identities and dense 
interpersonal networks exclusively to the group members, because these groups in general are better 
organised. It can also bee seen that campaigns focusing on solidarity incentives that focus on pre-
existing groups and linking the vision of change to the group’s existing culture are more successful in 
mobilising. (Jenkins, 1983: 538) 
Jenkins (2001: 14368) argues that research on Resource Mobilisation Theory has generally focused on 
three separate areas: 
i) The microprocesses giving rise to individual participation 
ii) Organisational  processes shaping mobilisation  
iii) Political opportunities that guide social movement development and outcomes 
All three of these research areas overlap and intertwine. The notions of individuals’ intrinsic feelings, 
opportunities for political change and the resources needed for these changes are all dependent on 
each other. Our analysis will incorporate all three areas,  
We will largely focus upon the second of these areas as it is the most relevant to our first working 
question: ‘Can Resource Mobilisation Theory be used to understand how Hezbollah mobilises its 
resources?’ In order to answer this question we must place an emphasis on our predominant focus is 
on the actions of Hezbollah opposed to views of their supporters.  However, as social movements 
comprise of individuals wanting a collective change, we must consider elements of the first area and 
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the intrinsic values and interests of the Hezbollah supporters.  Whilst we acknowledge that many 
scholars consider political opportunities a key element of Resource Mobilisation Theory, we have 
decided to discuss the political opportunities of Hezbollah using a separate theory – ‘Political 
Opportunity Theory’. We will use this to answer out our second working question in examining how 
Hezbollah gains political influence.  
 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) summarise and contrast the Resource Mobilisation approach to the more 
traditional perspective that preceded it:  
1. Support base 
A. Traditional. Social movements are based upon aggrieved popu-lations which provide the necessary 
resources and labor. Al-though case studies may mention external supports, they are not incorporated 
as central analytic components.  
B. Resource mobilization. Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the 
presumed beneficiaries. Con-science constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major 
sources of support. And in some cases supporters-those who provide money, facilities, and even 
labor-may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements. 
 
2. Strategy and tactics 
A. Traditional. Social movement leaders use bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence 
authorities to change. Choices of tactics depend upon prior history of relations with authorities, 
relative success of previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the 
oligarchization and institutionalization of or-ganizational life. 
B. Resource mobilization. The concern with interaction between movements and authorities is 
accepted, but it is also noted that social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks. 
These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or trans-forming mass and elite publics into 
sympathizers, achieving change in targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may 
achieve one aim may conflict with behavior aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are 
influenced by inter-organizational competition and cooperation. 
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3. Relation to larger society  
A. Traditional. Case studies have emphasized the effects of the environment upon movement 
organizations, especially with re-spect to goal change, but have ignored, for the most part, ways in 
which such movement organizations can utilize the environ-ment for their own purposes (see Perrow 
1972). This has prob-ably been largely a.result of the lack of comparative organiza-tional focus 
inherent in case studies. In analytical studies emphasis is upon the extent of hostility or toleration in 
the larger society. Society and culture are treated as descriptive, historical context.  
B. Resource mobilization. Society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and 
other industries utilize. The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of 
affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks, and occupational structure 
and growth. 
(Source McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1216 – 1217) 
In trying to answer our first working question we shall use this framework to assess whether or not 
Resource Mobilisation Theory can be used to explain how Hezbollah mobilises its resources. 
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Political Opportunity Theory 
Political opportunity is phrase for describing how the society surrounding a social movement affects 
its mobilisation, development and the ultimate impact a social movement has on society (Meyer, 
2007: 1).  
Political opportunity theory tries to explain political actions and protests, initiated by activists and 
social protest movements. Political opportunity theory tries to produce a means to predict variance in 
the periodicity, style and content of activist claims over time and variance across institutional contexts 
(Meyer & Minkoff, 2004: 1458). Meyer (2004: 127) explains that political opportunity theory “arose 
as a corrective, explicitly, concerned with predicting variance in the periodicity, content and 
outcomes of activist efforts over time across different institutional contexts”.   
The structure behind political opportunity approach emphasizes the interaction between the activist 
efforts and mainstream institutional politics, assuming that they are closely related. Through their 
available means the constituencies can make claims to the authorities. (Meyer, 2007: 2) 
 
The primary point of this approach was that activists do not work in a vacuum. Rather, 
the political context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which 
activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others, encouraging 
some strategies of influence and forms of organization while discouraging others, and 
responding through policy reforms more readily at some times than others. The 
wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices, briefly their agency, could only 
be understood by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which 
those choices are made, that is, the structure. (Ibid.) 
 
In recent literature political opportunity is considered a major part of catalysing social movements 
potential for collective action into mobilisation (Suh, 2001: 439). Ben Klandermann has described 
political opportunity as: “The external environment within which movement participants evaluate how 
effectively collective action can attain desired goals” (Klandermann, 1988 in Suh, 2001: 440).  
Charles Tilly has defined the contradiction of political opportunity as: “increased state capacity and 
propensity to repress” (Tilly, 1978 in ibid.).  Furthermore Dieter Rucht defines the expansion of 
political opportunity as: “enhanced state capacity to implement policy responsive to movements’ 
collective demands” (Rucht, 1996 in ibid.). 
Political opportunity is directly related to the governmental system and its ability to govern the 
country. The weaker a political system is, the more political opportunities there are for protest 
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movements to grow and to exploit the weaknesses of the system. Protests movements will exploit that 
to build themselves or even capture the rule of the society (Azani, 2011: 5). 
Many theoreticians in political opportunity theory see a connection between the openness of the 
political system and the political means by activists. If authorities offer activists access to open and 
meaningful avenues, they are less likely to protest because they are offered less costly and more direct 
routes of influences. On the other hand political protests happen when activists have sufficient 
freedom to express themselves by using protests, but still are not sufficient advantaged not to use 
dramatic means (Meyer, 2004: 128). 
Doug McAdam has formulated four variables that he considers the factors behind political 
opportunity. The four variables of political opportunity is: 
1. Increasing popular access to the political system. 
2. Divisions within the elite. 
3. The availability of elite allies. 
4. Diminishing state repression. (McAdam, 1996 in Meyer, 2004: 132)  
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Contextualisation 
 
As Gleis and Berti (2012: 8) note, to understand Hezbollah is to understand the difficult and complex 
nature that is both Lebanon and Lebanese History. The two notions of religion and politics are often 
intricately intertwined and can be extremely difficult to separate. As Avon and Khatchadourian (2012: 
1) note, Hezbollah is a politico-religious entity whose frame of reference will be somewhat foreign to 
those unfamiliar with Arabic and Persian culture, which is profoundly Islamic. Whilst we do not have 
the scope to elaborate extensively on the complexities of Lebanese history, we intend to provide a 
concise overview of key religious and political events that have shaped the histories of both Lebanon 
and Hezbollah. It also provides an overview of how the organisation is structured along with its 
unique ideologies. We attempt to bring this section up to date by highlighting some of the key issues 
that Hezbollah faces today.  
 
A Politico-Religious History of Lebanon 
Often referred to as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’ (Avon and Khatchadourian 2012: 24), 
Lebanon is a democratic republic that is situated in Western Asia and is a similar size to the American 
state of Connecticut (10,400 km) (Gleis and Berti 2012: 8). As shown in Map 1, it shares its borders 
with Israel to the South, Syria to the North and East and the Mediterranean Sea to the West. This 
location at the crossroads of the Mediterranean Basin and the Arab hinterland has shaped Lebanon’s 
rich history and diverse cultural and religious identity (McGowen 1989 in Collelo 2009). It is a nation 
with a population of approximately 4 million people who are divided among eighteen different 
religious sects recognised by the Lebanese Constitution (Gleis and Berti 2012: 8). Scholars and 
academics often disagree as to the ethnic breakdown of a population and Lebanon is no exception. 
Due to political reasons a national census has not been conducted since 1932. However, Gleis and 
Berti (I bid) note that it is generally accepted that the various Muslim sects account for approximately 
60 percent of the total population with the remaining 40 percent comprising of various Christian sects. 
The Muslim population is believed to comprise of approximately 38 percent Shiite and 23-25 percent 
of Sunni. The remainder of this Muslim population consists of Druze, Isma ilite and Alawite sects. 
The Christian population include Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, 
Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt 
and Protestant sects (i bid). As a result of this uniquely complex communal make-up and its bordering 
of Syria and Israel, Lebanon has often been at the centre of Middle Eastern conflicts.     
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  Map 1 – Geographical Location of Lebanon 
 
According to the dominant and Christian Maronite national narrative, Lebanon is part of the 
Mediterranean civilization and its genealogy and history can be traced back to the Phoenician 
merchant communities who lived in the coastal areas of present-day Lebanon some three to four 
thousand years ago (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 20). As Gleis and Berti (2012: 8) note, traditionally the 
Maronites inhabited only the area around Mount Lebanon. The Shiites have been present in the 
country since the ninth century and settled in an area known as the Bekaa Valley on the southeast 
border of present-day Syria and in Jamal Amin, which exists roughly in the area of South Lebannon 
today (Hamzeh 2004 in Gleis and Berti (2012: 8). They chose these locations to settle as they were 
just off the radar of any administrative authorities (Olmert 1987 in Gleis and Berti (2012: 8).  
The split between the Sunnite and Shiite divisions of Islam occurred following a controversy 
surrounding the selection of Ali, the prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, as the fourth 
Caliph in 656 (Harik 2005: 8). His selection was opposed by the prophet’s companions and wife and 
resulted in them eventually leaving the community. These defectors subsequently preached that that 
anyone who closely followed God’s law might become Caliph and that it was not necessary to keep 
the line of succession within the Quraysh (I bid). However, on the contrary, Ali’s supporters insisted 
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on the sanctity of the Prophet’s line through Mohammed and his daughter, Fatimah. In 661 Ali was 
eventually assassinated by one of the faction that opposed him. This created a split between his 
partisans known as the Shiites (shiat Ali – the faction of Ali) and the rest of the community, who 
constituted the majority, known as the followers of Mohammed’s sunnah (exemplary behaviour of the 
prophet) or Sunnites (Harik 2005: 8). Precocupation with who should rule and the special qualities of 
the rule constitutes the main distinction between Shiite and Sunnite political thought (I bid). 
Though traditionally less powerful than their Sunni brethren, the Shiites originally reached their peak 
of dominance in the tenth century when the Twelver Shiites ruled Iraq and Iran and the Ismailis ruled 
Egypt, North Africa and Syria (Gleis and Berti 2012: 8). These dynasties were relatively short lived as 
those areas were conquered and re-conqured, until they eventually fell under the rule of the Sunni-led 
Ottomon Empire. This dominated a large proportion of the Middle East until it was defeated in the 
First World War (I bid). Appadurai (1996: 27) notes how Islam has previously used warfare as a 
means of religious conversion. The Ottomon Empire did not implement such extreme tactics, however 
during its rule over Lebanon for over 400 years between 1500-1900s, it ensured the Shia were 
persecuted, discriminated against and excluded from nearly all forms of political power as the Sunni-
Ottomans viewed them as heretics (Hamzeh in Gleis and Berti (2012: 8).  
French Rule & The Mithaq al-watani 
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s, the League of Nations put Lebanon under a 
French mandate. The French envisioned that area could become a safe haven for the small Christian 
population in that area of the Middle East (Gleis and Berti 2012: 8). Subsequently they exploited their 
mandate by carving large chunks out of Syria to create a viable ‘Greater Lebanon’ thereby thwarting 
the Arab nationalist dream of reuniting Syria and Lebanon (Norton 2007: 11). The new borders of 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were decided on the basis of European interests opposed to local ethnic or 
political dynamics (Manning 2012). The Maronites were the favoured ally of French power and 
influence in the region but now had to accept that Lebanon was not an appendage to Europe but an 
Arab state. Neither Sunnis or Maronites spoke with a single voice, however they were the two 
dominant political voices within Lebanon and would provide the terms of reference when it gained its 
independence from the French in 1943 (I bid).  
The defining compromise of Lebanese politics was the mithaq al-watani or national pact, an 
underwritten understanding between the dominant Maronites and Sunnis (I bid). The political system 
that emerged from this pact was formalised into a system of sectarian communities. Each of the 
country’s seventeen recognised sects were assigned political privileges in relation to their size. As 
Norton (2007: 12) notes, this process was rather inaccurate, except for the highest political positions 
which were awarded to the Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites. The Shiite community was the third largest 
and therefore awarded far weaker powers than its larger Maronite and Sunni counterparts. The 
presidency was allocated to the Maronites and the Sunnis were assigned the premiership. The Shia 
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community was assigned the speakership of the parliament, a position with far weaker constitutional 
powers than either the presidency or the premiership (I bid).  
This imposed structure cemented the idea that the Shia were the Lebanese underclass (Samii 2008: 
32).  As a result of this imbalance of power, the Shia were subsequently left impoverished and 
underdeveloped, with the majority of Shiites being situated in the south of the country and in the 
northern Beqaa valley (Norton 2007:12). A large number of Shiite farmers left Lebanon in order to 
seek work in Africa, Latin America and oil producing Arab nations. This process was further 
accelerated following the influx of Palestinian migrants between 1948 and 1949 during the Palestinian 
war (I bid). This influx consisted of 100,000 Christian and Sunni immigrants who the Lebanese would 
later blame for their civil war. Approximately half of these would later be granted Lebanese 
citizenship (Shafie 2007: 14). Harik (2005: 23) notes that that the dissatisfaction at the Lebanese 
political system continued to grow as the establishment’s main interest seemed to be preserving the 
status quo rather than addressing any problems that its critics raised.    
 Gleis and Berti (2012: 9) note that the only gains that the Shiites had on their Sunni and Christian 
counterparts came in the form of their birth rate. By 1950 approximately 19 percent of the total 
Lebanese population were Shiites, yet before long they outnumbered all other sects. However, no 
census was ever again taken to indicate whether a different distribution of power among the sects 
should be undertaken. The secular arrangement of 1943 had thus ossified into a system that 
guaranteed Christian political domination regardless of the size of their population in comparison to 
the other sects (Harik 2005: 18). As a result of their increasing population the Shia slowly began to 
demand greater political rights and a more equitable share of the national budget as they believed that 
their traditional zuama (lords) were not providing them with sufficient resources.  
By the 1960s many young Shiites became attracted to new political forces and alienated from their 
traditional predecessors. Norton (2007: 14) notes how a handful of powerful families dominated Shia 
politics at this time and maintained their control through extensive patronage networks. Therefore 
counter elites or regime opponents had little chance of ever replacing the ‘establishment’ through 
legal or normal political channels (Harik 2005: 18). A promise of radical change was offered by 
secular opposition parties such as the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP), and the Organisation for Communist Labour Action. These parties were naturally 
ideological attractive to the Shiites as they condemned the tribal, religious and ethnic bases of 
discrimination.  
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The Palestinian – Israeli War  
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian land is without doubt one of the main axes around which Middle 
Eastern politics revolves, influencing political and social development in all the Arab countries 
(Høigilt 2007: 123). By 1967 a second wave of Palestinian refugees entered Lebanon following the 
outbreak of the Six-Day War. Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) sought to 
become the representative of the Palestinians in world politics and it took control of Palestinian 
refugee camps in both Lebanon and Jordan developing educational and social service organisations 
(Harb 2011: 72). Furthermore, its military arm (the Fedayeen) used Lebanon as a base for further 
attacks on Israel. In the autumn of 1969, Lebanon signed a pact, named the Cairo Agreement, with the 
PLO legitimising their right to operate from Southern Lebanon (Fisk 2001: 74 in Harb 2011: 74). This 
brought about massive Israeli retaliation such as a helicopter raid that burned 13 Lebanese civil 
airliners at Beirut International Airport on 28th December 1968. Subsequently this created tension 
between the Palestinians and parts of the Lebanese community (Friedman 1998: 16 in Harb 2011: 72). 
As a result of these tensions, by the end of the 1960s four major trends distinguished the political 
mobilisation of the Lebanese Shia: secularism, liberation – especially the view that the fate of the 
deprived Shia was linked to the dispossessed Palestinians, Islamism and reformism, often couched in 
demands for more access to political privilege and for stamping out corruption (Norton 2007 : 15). 
In 1970 the PLO were driven out of Jordan after King Hussein’s decision to launch a full-scale 
offensive against them following the Dawson’s Fields hijackings. Palestinian guerrillas hijacked three 
international airliners and held them at an airfield in the Jordan desert before blowing them up shortly 
after releasing the hostages (BBC News). As a result Yasser Arafat and the PLO immediately 
relocated to Southern Lebanon to set up their new base in Palestinian refugee camps (Harb 2011: 75). 
Subsequently Lebanon’s Arqoub region was heavily damaged by Israeli forces and their hunt for 
Palestinian guerrillas. Pressure from the UN Security Council and the United States forced the 
withdrawal of the Israelis and the Lebanese army was deployed to the region (Cooley 1973: 131 in 
Harb 2011: 75). Although the PLO’s relocation to districts of Beirut and the South was not welcomed 
by many in Lebanon, notes how the nationalist socialist parties, mostly Muslim and Druze identified 
with their cause and thought they could utilise them in pressuring the ruling Maronite Christians into 
sharing more political power (Fisk 2001 in Harb 2011: 75). Feeling threatened by the increased 
demands of the Muslims, the Maronites wanted the PLO out of their sphere of influence. The political 
parties and movements of the left joined the Muslims in creating one body known as the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) and this opposed a crackdown on the powers of the PLO as it had become 
their main support in bringing political changes to the way that Lebanon was run and dominated by 
the Maronites (Friedman 1998: 17 in Harb 2011: 76). This resulted in political deadlock and the 
Lebanese Government and army became paralysed. Christian Maronites turned to their own armies – 
the Phalangists and Tiger militias in order to deal with the Palestinians (I bid). An attack by these 
militias on a civilian bus killed 27 Palestinians and consequently drew retaliation from guerrillas 
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backed by the LNM. Eventually the Lebanese army was splintered with Christian elements siding 
with their tribes and Muslim elements siding with theirs. This escalation resulted in the outbreak of a 
full scale civil war on 13 April 1975 (Friedman 1998, Fisk 2001; Picard 2002 in Harb 2011: 76).  
In addition to the war between the Christian and the Muslims sects, Israeli forces continued to clash 
with civilian villagers, the Lebanese left-wing factions and the Fedayeen (Harb 2011: 76). In the 
absence of an effective government, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in March 1978, occupying 
almost 7 percent of Lebanese territory (I bid). No compensation was forthcoming from the state for 
lost income or destruction of property caused by the Israelis. This situation led to general Shiite 
political mobilization, of which the fundamentalists were a part (Harik 2005: 21). The United Nations 
Security Council approved Resolution 425, forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, depriving them 
of any political dividends they would gain from the invasion, such as control of the Litani River. The 
resolution also established a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (I bid: 77).  
However, Israel did not acknowledge the resolution and a militia known as the Southern Lebanon 
Army was formed in order to keep order in the area in conjunction with the Israeli army.  
 
Ironically, the incident that eventually triggered war between Israel and Lebanon took place in 
London on 3 June 1982. The Israeli Ambassador to London was shot and injured by Palestinian 
gunmen of Abu Nidal’s group (Harb 2011: 78). Even more bizarrely, Nidal was a sworn enemy of the 
PLO and its leader Arafat and even made attempts to assassinate him (Bregman 2000: 158 in I bid). 
On 6 June 1982, supported by the Phalangists, the Israeli army launched a massive military operation 
against Lebanon. The Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon believed that destruction of the PLO in 
Lebanon would shatter Arafat’s influence among the inhabitants of the West Bank (I bid).  By June 14 
1982 the Israeli army had reached Beirut and bombarded residential areas of its western side heavily, 
along with dropping propaganda in an attempt to intimidate civilians into leaving (Tanter 1990: 149, 
160 in Harb 2011: 78). On 21 August, the PLO and Arafat left Beirut for Tunisia after the Americans 
had negotiated an agreement between the two parties. This deal stated that if the PLO evacuated 
Beirut, the Israeli army would refrain from entering the city’s western side (Harb 2011: 78). However 
on the 15th September, following the assassination of Bashir Jumayyil, the head of the Phalangists and 
Israel’s biggest ally, the Israeli army invaded West Beirut in defiance of their agreement with the US. 
The following day, under the supervision of the Israeli army, the Phalangists committed a massacre of 
3,000 civilians in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Meanwhile the Lebanese 
Communist Party, the Communist Labour organisation, and the Lebanese Nationalist Social party led 
the first Lebanese resistance operations against the Israelis in Beirut (Harb 2011: 80). In 1984 Israel 
withdrew into what would later be known as its ‘security zone’ in Southern Lebanon. This granted 
them control over the Litani River. They selected a Lebanese Officer, Saad Haddad to be the head of 
the South Lebanon Army (SLA) (I bid).  
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History of Hezbollah 
Information regarding the origins of Hezbollah are murky, however it is widely accepted that it was 
founded sometime between 1982 and 1983, while becoming fully operational in terms of both 
structure and guerrilla warfare tactics in 1984 (Gleis and Berti 2012). Consisting of disaffected 
members of Amal, unemployed Shiites who were Former Fatah fighters and members of other 
militias, Hezbollah’s actions first appeared following the bombing of the American Embassy in 1983 
and the French paratrooper barracks in Beirut in 1985 (Szekely 2012: 115). However it was not until 
1985 and that the movement issued an open letter officially announcing its existence (as discussed 
later on in this chapter). 
Various conditions coincided to help spawn the creation of Hezbollah. Azani (2011: ix) argues that it 
is clearly a product of internal Lebanese ethnic sectarian structure, unique geopolitical conditions and 
movements of Shiite Islamic nature. However, as Harb (2011: 80) notes, the 1982 Israeli invasion was 
one of the primary factors that brought several members and religious leaders of different Shiite 
political movements together. In an interview conducted with Hezbollah’s newspaper ‘Al Ahd’ in 
1997, Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the party, stated that he had doubts if Hezbollah 
would have been born if the ‘enemy [Israel] had not taken this step [the invasion]’ (Saad-Ghorayeb in 
I bid).    
Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 was particularly crucial in its foundation as it ushered in a new 
sense of political Islam around the world, particularly amongst the Shia population.  Following the fall 
of the Shah, Shiite clerics subsequently became the ultimate authority of the Iranian regime. This had 
a positive effect on the Shia worldwide and it filled them with a renewed sense of empowerment, 
pride and independence, after suffering for so long under the repression of the Sunnis.  Gleis and Berti 
(2012: 36) note that the new Iranian regime made it a policy to export its revolution to other Muslim 
communities, an issue that was particularly worrisome to the Sunni-dominated Arab world. By the 
early 1980s Iran was already heavily involved in the Iran-Iraq War and the Lebanese Shia provided 
the perfect population to which the revolution could be spread. It had already been plagued with 
conflicts that involved both Israel and the United States and the Shiite youths were more than willing 
to sacrifice themselves (I bid).  
The infancy of Hezbollah also coincided with the early stages of globalization. The expansion of the 
arms industry resulted in the world market being flooded with cheap weaponry that is ideal for 
irregular warfare. Improved media communications enabled ayatollahs to reach their target audiences 
more effectively, not only in Lebanon but around the globe.  
The trigger of the party’s emergence was the disappearance of the leader of the mass Shiite movement 
that had evolved by 1974 – Imam Musa al Sadr. He was a Lebanese of Iranian origin and was helped 
by various religious groups in Iran to found a number of charitable institutions in South Lebanon 
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during the 1960s (Harik 2005: 22). He also helped to establish and became the first president of the 
Higher Shiite Islamic Council, an institution that gave the Shia formal recognition at state level and 
looked after its interests (I bid). He had called for compensation for those who had lost properties in 
southern Lebanon as a result of the Israeli raids. He also established the Movement of the Disinherited 
(harakat al-mahrumin) whose goal was universally expressed as seeking social justice for all deprived 
Lebanese, although it predominantly had a Shiite foundation. As various Lebanese militias started to 
become armed as the civil war approached, a military wing of al-Sadr’s movement was created. This 
was known as the Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance (afwaj al muqawamat al lubnaniya – Arab 
acronym AMAL) and was funded by Libya, a client of the Soviet Union at the time  (I bid). Al-Sadr’s 
abrupt disappearance on a trip to Libya in 1978 wiped out the Islamic content of the mass movement. 
A leading cleric of the movement broke away to establish an Islamic counterpart of AMAL in the 
northern Bekaa with the objectives of fighting injustice and the ‘infidels’ - the Israelis in the south. 
Musawi’s actions constituted the magnet that attracted a group of fundamentalist clerics who had all 
studied under the religious scholar and theorist Baqir al-Sadat at a religious seminary in Najaf, Iraq – 
the same place where Ayatollah Khomeini and the Lebanese mullah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah 
had also been educated. Other Shiite fundamentalist splinter groups were also drawn to this movement 
out of which Hezbollah eventually emerged (I bid: 23).     
Hezbollah’s Ideology 
In his article ‘The Phoenix of Ideology’, Israeli Political Scientist Gayil Talshir (2005: 107) begins by 
using Karl Dietrich Bracher’s (1984: 5) definition of constitutes an ideology. Bracher argued that 
ideology was the most distinctive feature of politics since the turn of the last century, characterised by 
the attempt of groups – nations, states, organizations – to simplify complex realities into one, all-
embracing truth in a bipolar framework of foe/friend. At the time of Hezbollah’s emergence (during 
the civil war and the Israeli intervention) the reality within Lebanon was very complex. Formulated at 
the time of the Civil War and the Israeli invasion, this document reflects a Manichean view of the 
World, divided between the forces of the evil (namely the West and its Middle Eastern allies) and the 
forces of good: the Party of God (Gleis & Berti 2012: 51). 
Hezbollah’s ideology and core principles are rooted in its religious beliefs, and as such, have 
remained constant throughout its political and military development. However, it has also displayed 
the capacity to adapt its discourse to the changing political and security landscapes (I bid). The party 
declared its ideological, jihad, political and social visions when it issued the Open Letter, on the first 
anniversary of the assassination of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, a bright young cleric from Southern Lebanon 
(Qassim 2005: 99).  The group’s initial goals were to lead the nascent Shiite insurgency against the 
Israelis and rid Lebanon of Western forces and influences. Ultimately it wanted to establish Lebanon 
as an Islamic state.   
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Norton (2007: 35) notes how the letter bears a ‘Made in Tehran’ coloration.  It references the 1978-79 
revolution as proof of what can be accomplished when the faithful gather under the collective banner 
of Islam.  The letter refutes Western ideas claiming that ‘Only Islam can bring about man’s 
renaissance, progress and creativity’. Furthermore any existing fractiousness among Muslims was 
attributed to imperialism imposed by colonialism (I bid: 37). In Hezbollah’s worldview, compromise 
and mediation were not an option. Negotiations with Israel would represent acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine. This absolutism explains the operational links 
between Hezbollah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups that have opposed the efforts of mainstream 
PLO officials to make peace with Israel (I bid: 39).   
The starring role for Islam’s enemy, according to the letter, went to the United States. It referred to the 
US as the Israeli ‘spearhead’, which was the source of ‘all malice’ inflicting direct or indirect 
suffering upon the Muslims of Lebanon (I bid).  Furthermore the French were also attacked, largely 
because of their long-standing support of the Maronite community in Lebanon.     
The Early Years and Taif Pact 
To help it achieve its goals, Hezbollah received backing from Iran and Syria who supported the group 
to varying degrees for their own purposes. By helping arm and train Hezbollah, Iran were able to 
attack Israel indirectly, have a hand in the Arab-Israeli peace process (which it opposed) and expand 
Shiite influence in the Arab world (Gleis & Berti 2012: 40). Syria initially provided funding as it 
hoped Hezbollah would provide a balance against other Lebanese groups (Christian and Sunni) that it 
feared would become too powerful and subsequently block Syrian intervention or assistance (I bid). 
However, Syria were also an ally and backer of Amal, who were in competition with the Party of God 
to emerge as the more significant Shiite party. The Syrians were concerned that Hezbollah and Iran 
were en route to creating another Islamist state in their most important backyard. Subsequently Syrian 
troops initially backed Amal’s attacks on Hezbollah and occasionally directly attacked the Party of 
God themselves (I bid: 42).  
At the onset of its creation, Hezbollah’s relationship with non-Shiite Lebanese parties was very tense. 
It refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Lebanese government or its basis for existence and 
consequently refused to take part in the existing political system (I bid: 40). This would later change 
as Hezbollah began to gravitate towards adopting an identity that had Lebanese nationalism at its 
core, rather than the dominant Shiite characteristics that it originally embraced at its onset. However, 
initially the organisation wanted to enforce a strict code of Islamic behaviour on the Shiite population, 
banning all actions considered prohibited by Islam including: alcohol, social gatherings with loud 
music, dancing, women in bathing suits and even coffee shops (Gleis & Berti 2012: 41). This 
imposition of extreme Sharia Law came as a shock to most Lebanese and was greeted with a 
backlash. Consequently support for Hezbollah fell significantly towards the end of the civil war and 
before the organisation’s political transition (I bid).  
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Following Israel’s initial invasion in June 1982, a variety of groups across the political spectrum 
began to organise attacks against the Israeli occupation forces. These included factions of the Ba’th 
and Communist parties, Nasserist organisations and other secular nationalist groups (Norton 2007 : 
80). By the 1990s, however Hezbollah was carrying out the majority of attacks, each carefully 
planned and executed with a great degree of professionalism.   
It was not until 1990 that most of the Christian and Muslim leaders of Lebanon met in a reconciliation 
conference at Al Taif in Saudi Arabia and agreed to put an end to the civil war. This agreement was 
later known as the Al Taif Accord and the former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, who was 
assassinated in February 2005 by a car bomb, was the architect of this accord (Harb 2011 : 90). 
Subsequently the official institutions of Lebanon regained their unity and power and the Lebanese 
Government declared its support for the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupation in the 
south. Approximately 144,000 people are estimated to have people died as a result of this internal 
conflict, with an additional 184,000 who were wounded, including 13,000 who were permanently 
handicapped (Blandford in I bid). Furthermore about 90,000 families were displaced from their homes 
and a minimum of 17,000 people were left unaccounted for, having just vanished (I bid).     
Israeli Withdrawal & Subsequent Return 
After 22 years of occupation, Israel made a unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 
2000. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) certified Israeli compliance with UN 
Security Council Resolution 425 on 24 July 2000 (Harb 2011: 90). Lob (2014: 2) notes although the 
Israeli withdrawal marked a Hezbollah victory and subsequent rise in popularity, the organisation 
underwent an existential crisis. Now that the occupier had withdrawn, what was Hezbollah’s raison 
d’etre? Thus the organisation deployed troops to the South of the country in order to dispute the 
legitimacy of a small swath of territory known as the Shebba Farms, a small piece of land occupied by 
the Israelis, which they claimed to Syrian. The Lebanese declared the continuation of its struggle 
against the Israel until it withdrew from this area, released all Lebanese detainees from Israeli prisons 
and stopped violating Lebanese air space (O’Shea 2004 in I bid).  
Tension created by minor incidents on the border over the course of six years began to escalate and on 
July 12 2006, Hezbollah launched an operation on Israeli soil that intended to demonstrate the 
organisation’s formidable offensive abilities and appeal to Lebanese critics of the organisation who 
were calling on it to disarm (Norton 2007: 135). An ambush on an Israeli patrol in the North East of 
Israel resulted in the deaths of three Israeli soldiers and the capture of two more. Subsequently Israel 
deployed a force to try and ensure the return of their two men. As an Israeli tank drove over the 
border, it drove over a land mine and subsequently five more soldiers died. This resulted in an 
aggressive Israeli response in an armed conflict which lasted 34 days and resulted in 1,164 fatalities 
(mainly civilian Lebanese) (Kattan N/A 26). Approximately 900,000 Lebanese civilians were 
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displaced due to the heavy bombing campaign that the Israelis implemented and extensive damage 
was caused to areas in the South of the country.  
Although the count of civilian casualties was high and the damage to the South of the country far-
reaching, Israel withdrew from Lebanon without having rescued the captured soldiers or removed 
Hezbollah from Lebanon. Hezbollah lost over 500 fighters, and a great deal of its arsenal was 
destroyed, however its leadership and structure remained intact (Cordesman 2006 in Szekely 2012: 
121).  Hezbollah declared a ‘divine victory’ (naṣrāllah) a name identical to that of its charismatic 
Secretary General, Hassan Nasarallah (Lob 2014: 2). This victory came against the odds as the IDF 
had initially deployed 10,000 soldiers compared to Hezbollah’s 2,000 – 3,000. By the end of the war 
those numbers had risen to 30,000 and 10,000 respectively (Szekely 2012: 122). Not only did the 
Israelis have an advantage in quantity, but its military arsenal was also vastly superior. As Norton 
(2007: 143) notes, both sides paid a heavy price for the war and it was a conflict without an 
unequivocal winner. Both Israel and Hezbollah went to war to bolster their creditability and perceived 
ability to deter enemies, yet in neither case did they fully succeed.  
Structure of Hezbollah 
For much of its history, Hezbollah was an underground organisation. Although its military wing today 
is still hidden under a veil of secrecy, the rest of the organisation has the luxury of maintaining a 
complex and relatively open leadership in comparison to many of its Sunni-Islamist counterparts 
(Gleis and Berti 2012: 61). From its headquarters situated in Beirut, Hezbollah provides a wide range 
of services operating from schools, hospitals, construction companies and even a satellite 
communication network. It operates these simultaneously with overseeing its military and ‘resistance’ 
activities (I bid). 
At the head of the organisation sits the Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. This role has 
traditionally been an honorary title as the majority of organisational power sits within the Shura 
Council (Majlis al-Shura) or Consultive Council. This council is responsible for electing the Secretary 
General and his deputy (currently Naim Qassem). Ensuring that the group’s religious ideologies are 
never compromised, the Shura Council usually consists of one lay leader and six clerics.  This council 
is responsible for overseeing Hezbollah’s political and military decision-making processes as it is 
accountable for five executive groups: The Executive Council, Politburo (Political Council), 
Parliamentary Council, Judicial Council and Jihad Council (Gleis and Berti 2012: 61). However, as 
prevention against Israeli intelligence infiltration, the organisation has purposely removed many 
intermediaries between the top military leadership and local commanders on the ground. (I bid: 64). 
The five executive groups are responsible for the following: 
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1) Executive Council – oversees political party and organisational management, including 
social, cultural and educational activities 
 
2) Politburo – monitors and manages relations with domestic political actors 
 
3) Parliamentary Council – manages Hezbollah’s activities in parliament and provides 
legislative analysis and constituent services 
 
4) Judicial Council – provides religious rulings and conflict mediation services for Hezbollah 
members and communities 
 
5) Jihad Council – manages ‘resistance’ including oversight, recruitment training equipment, 
security and other activities 
(Source: Addis and Blanchard 2011: 10) 
 
Hezbollah’s Organisational Structure (Cohler 2011) 
Although the overall organisation exhibits a formal hierarchical structure, Gleis and Berti (2012: 65) 
note that the military wing does not present a similar picture. The fighters are covert, operations 
secretive and there is only one leader who is situated in Beirut. The other units in the field are 
autonomous and do not conform to military hierarchies or command levels (I bid). Furthermore, less 
is known about the organisation’s External Security Apparatus (ESA). This is a separate entitiy from 
the Islamic Resistance and is responsible for conducting terrorist attacks and other operations outside 
the immediate Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli borders (I bid). The unit has been important in implementing 
attacks on Jewish and Western targets around the world and instrumental in training and funding 
Palestinian groups.    
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Post 2006 
Since 2006, Hezbollah has continued to have a significant role within Lebanese politics. The 2009 
national election resulted in Hezbollah winning 10 parliamentary seats and afterwards Hezbollah was 
holding two cabinet posts in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Administrative Reform 
(Addis and Blanchard, 2011: 9). Since 2012, Hezbollah has been active in the Syrian civil war 
providing military assistance and fighters to the Assad regime. Hezbollah has been active in several 
important military battles in Syria, e.g. in the city of Qusayr, close to the Syrian-Lebanese border 
(Lob, 2014: 3). In November, Hezbollah rival Future Bloc said it would only form a cabinet if 
‘Hezbollah returns from Syria’ (Ibid). Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah called this an 
‘impossible condition,’ and as of January 2014, the government remained gridlocked while Beirut 
appeared to be turning into a proxy battleground for the neighbouring civil war. Regardless of all its 
achievements, or perhaps because of them, Hezbollah has recently faced growing discontent and 
mounting criticism, not only from other Lebanese factions but from its own Shiite constituents (Lob 
2014: 1). Some experts believe that Hezbollah’s erosion of domestic support originated with its recent 
intervention in Syria.  Hezbollah is currently at a critical juncture in its political evolution. Its recent 
involvement in Syria has raised the question: is it a Lebanese nationalist organisation or a group more 
interested in protecting Shiite interests throughout the Middle East? (Masters and Laub 2014).   
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Mobilising Hezbollah’s Resources 
 
This chapter intends to examine if Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) is instrumental in 
understanding how Hezbollah mobilise its various resources in order to try and achieve its political 
goals and objectives. ‘Resources’ are taken broadly to mean any social, political or economic asset or 
capacity that is able to contribute to collective action (Jenkins 2001: 14369). We intend to use 
McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) general framework of RMT to discuss whether or not it is instrumental 
in analysing how Hezbollah mobilises its resources.  We will discuss key Hezbollah resources and 
consider whether or not RMT would be a suitable theory to explain how these are mobilised. We shall 
consider its support base, strategies and tactics and how it relates to larger society. 
 
1) Support Base 
  
“Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries. Con-
science constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in 
some cases supporters-those who provide money, facilities, and even labor-may have no commitment 
to the values that underlie specific movements” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217).   
As documented in our Contextualisation chapter, Hezbollah was originally formed as a resistance 
movement against the Israeli invasion and out of the grievances of the Lebanese Shiite population 
who felt that their interests were not being represented by the Lebanese state.  Therefore on the basis 
of McCarthy and Zald’s first point, RMT is able to account for why Hezbollah initially evolved in the 
1980s as a movement.  
 
RMT could also be instrumental in explaining Hezbollah’s conscience constituents. Levitt (2005) 
argues that according to Hezbollah Parliamentarian Mohammad Raad, the organisation’s main income 
comes from its own investment portfolios and wealthy Shiites. Many of these wealthy Shiites who 
contribute financially reside abroad, particularly Lebanese nationals living in African and South 
American countries. Therefore RMT may be useful in accounting for its conscience constituents as 
McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1216) argue: ‘Con-science constituents, individual and organizational, 
may provide major sources of support.’   
 
Szekely (2012:112) notes that non-state actors, including Hezbollah acquire most of their resources 
externally. This generally means obtaining resources from the local civilian population or a patron 
state. In the case of Hezbollah, its patron state is Iran. Hezbollah proved the perfect ally for the Iranian 
revolution due to a shared ethno-communal identity and shared ideology. These shared ideologies 
arose as the leaders of the two parties were educated together in Najaf, Iraq (Ibid.: 115).  
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McCarthy and Zald (1975: 1216) argue that’ in some cases supporters-those who provide money, 
facilities, and even labor-may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements. 
 
Iran sponsors Hezbollah as it acts on its behalf as a proxy military force against Israel. Being able to 
attack the Israelis through Hezbollah is the predominant reason for large financial endowments and 
military support. Hezbollah has made efforts at diversification of its financial revenues, investing 
heavily in efforts such as self-sufficiency in order to achieve some degree of financial independence 
from Iran. However the strategic partnership between the two is still the core of the organisation 
(Gleis and Berti 2012: 64). Levit (2005) notes that western diplomats and analysts estimate that 
Hezbollah receives up to $200m from Iran per year. Not only does it supply financial funding but it 
also provides material resources such as military equipment to its military wing. Such resources 
supplied from Iran are fundamental to Hezbollah and these are essentially contributed on the basis of 
shared ethno-communal identities and ideologies. Large financial endowments have enabled them to 
invest in other resources such as their various health, education and welfare institutions as explained 
in the later on in this chapter. The fundamental basis that underpins Iran’s support for Hezbollah is 
their shared ideology. Therefore we argue that RMT is not instrumental in accounting for Iran’s 
prolonged support of Hezbollah.   
 
McCarthy and Zald’s (1977: 1216) account of the traditional approach to social movement is unable 
to account for it either. They argue that ‘Although case studies may mention external supports, they 
are not incorporated as central analytical components.’ As a large proportion of Hezbollah’s funding 
comes courtesy of Iran, we do not see how they can be excluded as a central analytical component.              
Taking our above points into consideration we believe that RMT is able to explain certain issues 
relating to Hezbollah’s support base. It is instrumental in explaining its birth and how conscience 
constituents contribute towards it. However we do not feel that it is beneficial in trying to obtain an 
understanding of sustained external support, such as that offered by Iran.    
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2) Strategy and Tactics 
 
The concern with interaction between movements and authorities is accepted, but it is also noted that 
social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, 
neutralizing and/or trans-forming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in 
targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one aim may conflict with 
behaviour aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are influenced by inter-organizational 
competition and cooperation. (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217)   
 
McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217) argue that RMT is able to account for ‘the concern with interaction 
between movements and authorities’.  Since its decision to reform as a political party in 1992, 
Hezbollah has ensured that it is constantly interacting with the authorities. Three of its councils are 
responsible for the political activity of the organisation. The Politburo monitors and manages relations 
with domestic political actors and the Parliamentary Council manages Hezbollah’s activities in 
parliament and provides legislative analysis and constituent services. Furthermore The Executive 
Council oversees political party and organisational management, including social, cultural and 
educational activities. Therefore RMT is useful in explaining how Hezbollah mobilises its political 
resources in order to interact with the authorities and gain political influence.   
 
McCarthy and Zald (1975: 1217) also argue that RMT is able to explain that social movements ‘have 
a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilising supporters, neutralising and or transforming 
mass and elite publics into sympathisers, achieving change in targets’.  
 
Szekely (2012:111) notes how Hezbollah has over time changed its strategies in order to try and 
implement change regarding the mobilising of supporters. She argues that since the end of the Civil 
War, Hezbollah has adopted a strategy based on (a) a broader political and religious marketing 
approach towards civilians and state sponsors, (b) a vastly expanded network of social services 
(described later) and (c) a greatly reduced use of coercion towards civilians (banning alcohol, music, 
make up, singing, dancing etc). Szekely (Ibid) argues that non state actors such as Hezbollah are able 
to use marketing to deliberately shape how potential constituents and / or sponsors see themselves and 
the movement in relation to the broader political landscape. It is the assiduous marketing of 
Hezbollah’s mission and ideals that produces the most durable relationships with both civilians and 
sponsor states (Ibid).  
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The organisation’s charismatic leaders are typically intelligent, well educated calm and composed. 
They are essential in establishing not only a normative attachment to a cause, but also a belief that the 
movement in question is the legitimate representative of that cause (Ibid.: 113). The Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah epitomises such charismatic leadership. He became the face of the organisation and 
one of the most popular figures in the Arab and Muslim worlds following the Israeli withdrawal (Berti 
and Gleis 2012: 62). Hezbollah’s steady political progress, winning 10 seats in the 2009 parliamentary 
election (Addis and Blanchard 2011:10) suggests that such leadership and strategies have been 
instrumental in transforming the mass public into sympathisers. Therefore we argue that RMT can be 
used in order to account for Hezbollah’s range of strategies that are designed to mobilise resources.  
McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217) imply that RMT is able to account for the dilemmas that occur when 
social movements decide to employ a specific set of tactics as ‘what may achieve one aim may 
conflict with behaviour aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are influenced by inter-
organizational competition and cooperation’.  
Hezbollah’s decision to participate in the current Syrian civil war is a typical example of this. The 
decline in support from its constituents after deciding to become involved in this war has drawn 
comparisons to decline in support following the 2006 Israeli war (Lob 2014:1). As a result of the 2006 
war, many Lebanese felt that the deaths and destruction witnessed was too great a cost to pay for the 
deaths of ten Israeli soldiers (I bid). Levitt (2005) notes that since Assad inherited the presidency from 
his father there was strong evidence to suggest that Hezbollah had moved into Palestine arena by 
sending its own operatives to implement terrorist attacks in Israel and through establishing links with 
terrorist groups in the West Bank. This would have posed Hezbollah predicaments. On the one hand it 
considered Assad a key and advantageous ally but on the contrary its decision to become embroiled in 
the war may elect opposition from the Lebanese public.    
Lob (2014: 3) notes, the Syrian conflict had existential implications for Hezbollah based on its 
allegiances with Iran and Syria. If the al-Assad regime fell, Hezbollah would lose a major transit route 
through which it procured Iranian missiles, rockets, and other hardware. Since the range of Iran’s 
missiles was limited, the rockets Iran delivered to Hezbollah through Syria served as a strategic buffer 
and deterrent against Israel while Iran developed its nuclear program and pursued other interests in the 
region (Ibid). Al-Assad’s demise would isolate Hezbollah and erode its political and military standing 
in Lebanon.  
Although Lebanese Shiites recognized that al-Assad represented an important strategic ally for 
Hezbollah, they supported Syrian protesters and rebels in their fight against tyranny, oppression, and 
injustice (Ibid).  As a result, many Lebanese Shiites initially questioned, if not opposed, Hezbollah’s 
involvement in Syria. As a result of Hezbollah’s participation in the war, Shiite areas within Lebanon 
have been subjected to numerous suicide and car bombings, as well as rocket and artillery attacks 
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carried out by Syrian rebels and Sunni radicals (Ibid). Furthermore many Lebanese Shiites fear that 
Hezbollah’s intervention could exacerbate pre-existing sectarian tensions inside Lebanon.  
Taking our above points into consideration we believe that RMT is suitable in assessing certain issues 
relating to Hezbollah’s strategies and tactics. This includes its interaction with authorities and 
deciding on how to turn large numbers of the public into sympathisers. RMT also helps to explain any 
dilemmas they may have when considering if strategic decisions could turn out to be 
counterproductive.  
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3) Relation to Larger Society 
 
Society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other industries utilise. The 
aspect utilised include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to 
institutional centres pre-existing networks and occupational structure and growth. (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977: 1217)   
 
Bortolazzi (2011: 33) argues that the Lebanese state does not provide sufficient social services to its 
citizens and therefore each religious community has developed its own safety net. Hezbollah provides 
extensive access to social institutions these are the most respected in terms of quality and quantity 
with respect to those organised by other commutarian parties or movements (Ibid). Although its 
services are offered in predominantly Shiite areas, they are available to anyone regardless of their 
religious or political views. Since its decision to transform itself into a political party in 1992, these 
services have been made available to all Lebanese religious sects, not just the Shiite population. Since 
its foundation, Hezbollah has established more than ten service-based institutions governed by a strict 
executive hierarchy, servicing thousands of beneficiaries over the past twenty-five years Harb (2011: 
133). These institutions are nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) registered with the ministry of 
interior. We shall now discuss some of the institutions that Hezbollah offer and how they are 
instrumental in shaping support for the organisation.  
 
Healthcare 
Hezbollah possess its own health committee - The Islamic Health Organisation (IHO), which manages 
nine health centres and sixteen fixed and three mobile infirmaries catering to one fifty-one villages 
(Cammett 2007: 26  in Bortolazzi 2011: 33). Since 2001, three centres alone have provided free health 
care and medication to eighty-eight schools and continue to provide regular vaccinations in addition 
to launching promotions against smoking and disease-prevention awareness campaigns (I bid). 
Established in 1989 the Al-Jarha (Wounded Association), located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, 
has catered for over 3,000 men, women and children who were injured in the civil war or Israeli 
attacks. After a fighter or a civilian is injured the association accounts for all medical bills including 
any necessary trips abroad for specialised treatment (Bortolazzi 2011: 35). If required, the association 
also purchases, furnishes and equips apartments for members - complete with a nurse or maid. 
Additionally each wounded person receives a monthly stipend from the association. This is 
predominantly funded by a charity in Iran and individual contributions (Cammett 2007: 26  in 
Bortolazzi 2011: 35). 
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Education 
As Jenkins (2001: 533) notes the development of professional advocacy careers and training schools 
provide a ready supply of movement entrepreneurs. Lebanese public education is scarce and not of the 
highest quality. Subsequently families are looking to private, sectarian institutions where the overall 
quality of education exceeds that of the state system Bortolazzi (2011: 36). Lynch (2010 in Ibid) 
argues that academic quality may well increase with political and religious influence. In addition to 
providing books and stationary, Hezbollah has also assisted with school fees, scholarship fees and 
grants in order to provide ‘educational mobilization’ for the needy (Qassem 2005: 84). Hezbollah 
predominantly has an interest in informal education through its ‘Al Mahdi Scout’ movement.  
However, it was also responsible for establishing nine formal educational schools (‘Al-Mahdi’). 
These are now funded and managed by other non-governmental institutions (Bortolazzi 2011: 36). 
The ‘Imam al Mahdi Scouts’, consists of approximately 42,000 male and female scouts organised into 
499 different branches located predominantly in the Shiite communities of Beirut, the Beqqa Valley 
and south Lebanon. Investing in formal education and social movements such as the scouts is 
advantageous for Hezbollah as it can directly influence how future generations perceive the world. 
They can devise an education system in order to coincide with their ideologies and political stand 
points. Furthermore they can equip future generations with the necessary skills required for specific 
roles within the organisation. For example, the skills that a scout would learn could be transferrable to 
positions within the military wing  
 
Social Welfare and Charitable Organisations 
In conjunction with the Shaheed Association, Hezbollah created the Emdad Committee, an Islamic 
Charity that was designed to alleviate the social hardships of Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon. 
Its major objective is to support and help families without a bread winner (Ibid.).  
The Jihad al-Bina (‘Effort for the Reconstruction’) Development organisation, is an umbrella 
organization encompassing various sub-committees and organisations involved in a range of activities 
aimed at developing infrastructure in areas of the south of Lebanon. Established in 1988 the 
organisation initially aimed to facilitate reconstruction in the area caused by the civil war (Ibid.). 
Following the 2006 war with Israel, with nearly 20 years of experience in disaster management, Jihad 
al-Bina was preparing for reconstruction efforts even as Hezbollah’s military wing continued to battle 
Israeli forces. Norton (2007: 140) notes how $10,000 to $12,000 was paid to anyone who lost their 
homes. As many as 15,000 homeless families received grants.   
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McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217) also argue that social movements that utilise communication media 
comply with their third element of RMT. Hezbollah use the media for multiple reasons: to 
communicate with its followers, draw support to its cause and recruit. It is also used to influence the 
opponent’s perception of reality (Berti and Gleis 2012: 89). Hezbollah utilises communication media 
extensively and possess its own media communication network.  
Al Manar (the Beacon) is Hezbollah’s popular satellite television station. It employees approximately 
three hundred employees and has a budget of $15 million. This is larger than the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry’s public diplomacy budget and half the size of Al Jazeera’s (Cohen 2007: 26 in Berti and 
Gleis 2012: 98). Harb (2011: 189) notes how on the eve of the liberation celebrations on 25 May 
2000, Assayed Hassan Nasrallah declared: ‘If it was not for Al Manar, the victory would not have 
been achieved’.  
In addition to Al Manar, Hezbollah has multiple radio stations, including its largest Al-Nour (the 
Light), newspapers such as al-Intiqad (the Criticism) and a plethora of websites that are run 
independently. These enable it to spread its message of propaganda focusing on anti-Israeli, anti-
Semitic and anti-American rhetoric (Berti and Gleis 2012: 89). 
We have described under the ‘Support Base’ sub-heading how Hezbollah utilise ‘levels of affluence’. 
As Bortolazzi (2011: 27) notes, the collapse of the state during the Lebanese war caused community 
mobilisation in the Muslim south, where its institutions continue to this day. Thousands from the 
south moved to the southern suburbs of in order to establish illegal settlements that until the early 
2000s made up 40 percent of homes in this area (Brinkeroff 2009 in Bortolazzi 2011: 27). In 
conjunction with Amal, Hezbollah were able to take advantage of such settlements or ‘preexisting 
networks’ in order to establish their own charitable and welfare systems.       
Taking the above detailed analysis into consideration, we feel that RMT can be used very effectively 
in order to explain Hezbollah’s relation to larger society. It is instrumental in understanding how 
Hezbollah has utilised society. It can help to analyse how and why it has utilised communication 
media in the form of Al Manar and other media outlets. Furthermore it can help to explain how it 
utilises levels of affluence from wealthy Lebanese Shiites and why it provides such an extensive 
degree of access to institutional centres that have partially be built on pre-existing networks. 
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Hezbollah’s Political Opportunities 
 
In this chapter we will analyse which political opportunities have affected Hezbollah’s role in the 
Lebanese society and in the established political society of Lebanon. Using the relevant theory of 
political opportunity we will look at how the theory complies to the development of Hezbollah as an 
organisation. 
 
Hezbollah gaining political influence in the public 
One way for Hezbollah to gain political influence is to show its strength as an organisation.  As Azani 
(2011: 5) concludes “the weaker a political system is, the more political opportunities there are for 
protest movements to grow and to exploit the weaknesses of the system”. Therefore, a weak Lebanese 
political system will leave Hezbollah with more political opportunities to achieve its political 
objectives. 
A weak political system with small representation of government authorities has given Hezbollah the 
opportunity to build parallel societies and fill out the governmental responsibilities. This can be seen 
both in southern Lebanon and in Hezbollah’s making of a Shia Beirut suburb of al-Dahiye (Harb in 
Al-Sayyad & Massoumi, 2011: 128).  In the case of a-Dahiye, the Shia population, and largely 
Hezbollah supporters, defied the central governmental system and the governmental authority and 
therefore claimed their own political and social rights provided by Hezbollah (Harb in Al-Sayyad & 
Massoumi, 2011: 130).  One political reason that gives Hezbollah the opportunity to operate its own 
social and political institutions is that the sectarian groups of Lebanon are encouraged by the political 
system to manage the affairs of their own communities (Harb in Al-Sayyad & Massoumi, 2011: 132).   
To understand Hezbollah’s control of land and hence political control and influence in large 
communities in Lebanon, Political Opportunity Theory can give us some answers.  The surrounding 
society and current Lebanese political system have a great impact on Hezbollah’s opportunity to 
practice autonomous social and political power in large Lebanese communities. A vulnerable state 
and a weak political system leave Hezbollah with the opportunity to conduct its political influence and 
gain political control.   
As documented in out Contextualisation chapter, the Shiite population of Lebanon have been a 
marginalised political group through most of Lebanon’s contemporary history. The Ottoman Empire 
persecuted the Shiites and then they were marginalised by the French colonial power. Subsequently 
they have been stigmatised by the Christian and Sunni communities of Lebanon (Ibid.). Therefore 
throughout history the Shia of Lebanon have emphasised that they have been exploited and 
dispossessed by the political system and ruling political elite of Lebanon. This was the reasoning 
behind many young Shiites in the 1960s wanting to challenge the existing political system, which they 
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felt was misrepresenting them. This resulted in many young Lebanese becoming attracted to ideas of 
radical social and political change (Norton, 2007: 14-15).  
The general feeling among the Shia of being misrepresented and possessing distrust in the existing 
political system and elite would provide Hezbollah with an opportunity to exploit. The combination of 
a weak political system and the distrust in the ruling elite would give Hezbollah the opportunity to 
grow and gain political influence. Szekley (2013: 119) notes how the party’s extended network of 
social and welfare services has increased the organisation’s reputation for competence, fairness and 
honesty. 
Tilly (1978) mentions that the frequency of protests is directly related to the political openness of a 
state’s political system. If the population is offered a given constituency routine and avenues for 
access they are less likely to protest as they are given access to less costly and more direct channels to 
influence. On the contrary, the authorities can repress the public that can hinder them in acquiring the 
needed capacity and resources to launch their political claims (Meyer, 2004: 128).  Therefore some 
toleration towards the protestors from the authorities is needed before protests can occur.  
As we have already noted, sectarian groups within Lebanon are encouraged by the political system to 
manage its own affairs. This provided Hezbollah with the opportunity to gain influence and control 
the land of several communities in Lebanon, including the Beirut suburb of a-Dahiye. Furthermore, 
the feeling among the Shiite communities in Lebanon of being exploited and dispossessed by the 
ruling elite and a general distrust in the Lebanese political system have made it advantageous for the 
Hezbollah supporters to challenge the existing political system and build its own autonomous 
institutions. 
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Hezbollah’s rise in parliamentary politics 
After a long and intense internal debate within Hezbollah, it was decided that they should run for the 
national Lebanese election in 1992 (Abdul-Hussain, 2009: 71). The election resulted in Hezbollah 
winning eight parliamentary seats (Norton, 2007: 103).  One of the political objectives of joining 
parliamentarian politics was to achieve the political opportunity of redirecting money from the 
affluent neighbourhoods of Christians and Sunnis, supported by the existing political elite, towards 
the poorer Shiite communities who were at the core base of Hezbollah’s support platform (Lob, 2014: 
4). Additionally, because the Lebanese society was so divided into different sects an Islamic 
revolution converting the Lebanese society into an Islamic state with Islamic rule was impossible. 
Therefore the leadership of Hezbollah wanted to adopt a reform position, opposed to the previous 
revolutionary position, in order to achieve the political goals of the organisation (Norton, 2007: 99). 
To gain political influence, Hezbollah had to change its political objectives in order to obtain a larger 
support base and to gain important political allies within the existing Lebanese political elite. 
Hezbollah changed their motto from “Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” to “Islamic Resistance in 
Lebanon” (Abdul-Hussain, 2009: 71). Their objective was primarily changed from being an 
organisation claiming revolutionary change within the Lebanese society to primarily concentrating on 
being an anti-Israeli resistance force (Ibid.). The stronger focus on being an anti-Israeli resistance 
force was a major part of Hezbollah winning huge popularity among the Sunnis in Lebanon, and in 
the whole Arab World. This is due to the fact that the Palestinian cause traditionally had been a Sunni 
cause (Ibid.: 72).  
One of Doug McAdam’s variables for gaining political opportunity is the availability of elite allies 
(McAdam, 1996 in Meyer, 2004: 132). By pursuing these strategy changes, Hezbollah gained new 
allies,  within the existing political elite of Lebanon, as well as important regional allies outside 
Lebanon who exercised a large degree of political influence on internal Lebanese political power. E.g. 
the Syrian regime. At that time they were an occupational power within Lebanon and used their allies 
in the Lebanese cabinet and parliament to ensure that Hezbollah could fulfil its political goals of 
getting access to Israeli security zones and expanding their social service network (Abdul-Hussain, 
2009: 71). Aligning with the Syrian regime gave Hezbollah political opportunities to expand their 
political work and objectives, as the Syrian regime acted as a protector of Hezbollah in domestic 
Lebanese politics which gave them space to expand their political work and missions. 
In order to expand further political opportunities, Hezbollah needed to gain support from both non-
Shia constituencies and build alliances with non-Shia political parties inside the political elite of 
Lebanon. As mentioned before, the framing of Hezbollah as being an anti-Israeli resistance force 
played a crucial part of gaining support and alliances with non-Shia constituencies and political party, 
especially among the Sunnis. From the early stages of Hezbollah’s engagement in parliamentary 
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politics in Lebanon, one of the important objectives among the leaders of Hezbollah was to establish 
contact and build alliances with Sunni and Christian parties in the Lebanese parliament, which was 
primarily done by trying to change the negative image of Hezbollah in the Lebanese public (Azani, 
2011: 157).  
A crucial change in the political power balance in Lebanon was Syria’s 2005 withdrawal. This exit 
resulted in the Syrian regime’s influence on domestic politics in Lebanon declining significantly. 
Therefore Hezbollah had to find new allies among the constituencies and political parties of Lebanon. 
In order to try and gain support predominantly among the Lebanese Sunnis population, Hezbollah 
used its role as an anti-Israeli force politically. Hussain (2009:74) argues that one of the possible 
reasons behind the 2006 cross-border attacks on Israel and the abductions of the Israeli soldiers, 
which resulting in the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli war, was to gain support amongst the Sunni population. 
Hezbollah’s goals for the attacks and abduction of the Israeli soldiers was to achieve a prisoner swap 
with the Israeli government. Hezbollah subsequently achieved this. It is possible that a successful 
prisoner swap with Israel would have boosted their popularity among the Sunnis in Lebanon (Abdul-
Hussain, 2009: 74).   
As explained in this chapter, Political Opportunity Theory can be used in explaining some of 
Hezbollah’s development and consolidation in the Lebanese public and political system. The chapter 
also explains which conditions in the Lebanese society gave Hezbollah political opportunities to make 
claims and achieve its goals. As examined a weak Lebanese political system made it possible for 
Hezbollah to develop into an important and strong movement within Lebanon. Furthermore the 
distrust in the political elite and the feeling of marginalisation gave Hezbollah legitimacy as a serious 
contender to the existing political order, especially among the Shiite community. This chapter has also 
explained how Hezbollah through central political alliances rose in power within the Lebanese 
parliamentary system allowing them to claim and achieve some of their political objectives as a 
movement, such as strengthening their welfare institutions.    
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Conclusion 
 
This project intended to answer the research question ‘Can Hezbollah be understood as a social 
movement and how can its evolution be described in terms of social movement theories?’ In order to 
answer this question we analysed if Resource Mobilisation Theory and Political Opportunity theory 
can be used to account for how Hezbollah mobilises its resources and how it gains political influence.     
In the case of our first working question ‘Can Resource Mobilisation Theory be used to understand 
how Hezbollah mobilises its resources?’ we argue that RMT is an effective method for understanding 
how the organisation mobilises its resources. Using the general framework of McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) we discussed how RMT can be used to explain how Hezbollah utilises resources within its 
support base, such as conscience constituents and external sponsors like Iran. It could also be used in 
understanding the birth of the organisation. Furthermore we believe that RMT is suitable in assessing 
certain issues relating to Hezbollah’s strategies and tactics. Its interaction with the authorities and 
deciding on how convert large numbers of the public into sympathisers can be described using RMT. 
In addition to this RMT is also instrumental in explaining any dilemmas they may have when 
considering if strategic decisions could be counterproductive. Moreover, we feel that RMT can be 
used very effectively to explain Hezbollah’s relation to larger society. It is instrumental in 
understanding why it has utilised communication media in the form of Al Manar and other media 
outlets. Furthermore it can help to explain how it utilises levels of affluence from wealthy Lebanese 
Shiites and why it provides such an extensive degree of access to institutional centres that have 
partially be built on pre-existing networks.    
Our second working question asked if ‘Political Opportunity Theory can be used to understand how 
Hezbollah gains political influence?’ Drawing on the work of Eitan Azani (2011), David Meyer 
(2004) and Doug McAdam (in David Meyer 2004) we argue that this theory can be used to explain 
how Hezbollah has attempted to obtain political authority. We demonstrated how Political 
Opportunity Theory can be used in explaining some of Hezbollah’s development and consolidation 
within the Lebanese public and political systems. We explained how a weak Lebanese political 
system made it possible for Hezbollah to develop into a strong movement within the country. 
Furthermore we described how the distrust in the political elite and the feeling of marginalisation they 
elected from Lebanese civilians was contributory to Hezbollah becoming a serious contender in the 
Lebanese political order, especially among the Shiite community. We also explained how Hezbollah 
rose in power by forming allegiances within the Lebanese political elite and its Syrian neighbours in 
order to distance itself from an exclusive Shiite identity.  
As mentioned in our Introduction, Hezbollah has multiple facets and is considered to represent 
different things to different people. Whilst the two Social Movement Theories can both be utilised in 
46 
 
analysing how they mobilise its resources and how they gain political influence by capitalising on 
political opportunities, we cannot explicitly conclude if it is a social movement. In considering 
Tarrow and Tilly’s (1996:874) definition ‘sustained challenges to powerholders in the name of a 
disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those powerholders’, we feel 
that Hezbollah complies to this description. Having been established for approximately thirty years, 
Hezbollah must be considered as a ‘sustained’ entity. It was originally formed as a challenge to the 
existing ‘powerholders’, the Lebanese government, representing the interests of the Lebanese Shia 
who were living under the ‘jurisdiction’ of these ‘powerholders’ and did not feel they were being 
accounted for justly. Therefore it may be considered a social movement. However we do not feel that 
today’s Hezbollah still operates in a way that complies with this definition. Its decision to reform 
itself as a political party now ensures that it is part of the power holding process. Although it still 
predominantly symbolises the Lebanese Shia, its decision to reform itself and adopt a national identity 
opposed to an exclusive Shiite one, suggests that they are no longer only representing the intentions of 
the ‘disadvantaged’ that they had initially sought to depict.  
Although it complies with our selected definition of a social movement and the two social movement 
theories that we discuss can be used effectively to analyse how it mobilises its resources and attempts 
to gain political influence, we feel that Hezbollah is now too institutionalised, as displayed by its 
military and political involvements, to be considered solely a social movement. We feel that the lack 
of literature examining it as a social movement may be because of its multi facets and complexities 
which therefore mean it may be considered as an anomaly in terms of social movement theory.  
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Afterthought 
 
As concluded, we believe that Hezbollah cannot solely be considered as a social movement. Its move 
into the political arena and military activities ensure that it does not fully resemble a traditional social 
movement. Although we have examined whether or not Hezbollah can be labeled as a social 
movement, we feel that it would have been more appropriate to examine it as a social movement 
organisation. However, we only became aware that it resembled many of the characteristics of a social 
movement organisation when we were deep into our research process. If we were to write a similar 
project we would consider the differences between a social movement and a social movement 
organisation and examine which of the two Hezbollah resembles more. We also feel that due to the 
multiple approaches that Resource Mobilisation Theory and Political Opportunity Theory consist of, 
this project would have benefitted from the selection of just one of these theories. We do not feel that 
we have explored these two theories fully, however the scope of this project has been an instrumental 
factor in this.  
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